



An Experiment on Retail Payments Systems
We develop a novel theoretical and experimental framework to study adop-
tion and use of cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. The
design allows us to assess the behavioral impact of sellers’ service fees and
buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. In the experiment, buyers
and sellers faced a coordination problem, independently choosing a pay-
ment method before trading. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments
but buyers did not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards signifi-
cantly increased adoption and use of electronic payments. Buyers’ economic
incentives were crucial for the diffusion of electronic payments but cannot
fully explain their adoption choices.
JEL codes: E1, E4, E5
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IN THE LAST DECADES, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS HAVE GAINED a sig-
nificant share of retail transactions, eroding the usage share of cash and checks .
For example, debit cards have become the most used means of payment in one-third
of countries across the world (World Bank 2011). Convenience and reliability are
among the suggested reasons for the growing popularity of electronic payments in
retail transactions. Yet, significant differences in payment method adoption persist
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between developed and developing regions and several surveys show that cash enjoys
a wide use also in developed economies.1
The open issue—and the objective of this study—is to understand the empirical
determinants of the adoption of one payment method over another by consumers
and retailers. Developing such an understanding is especially important for
policymakers—central banks and government regulators—in assessing social
costs and benefits associated with the diffusion of specific payment methods.2
Unfortunately, the available data have two limitations. First, estimates of cash usage
are unreliable and it is difficult to characterize the relationship between relative
payment costs and the adoption of a payment method (Humphrey 2010). A second
limitation is that the available data mostly come from survey answers that are not
incentivized and therefore are subject to a number of biases and confounds. This
study takes a step toward resolving such problems by constructing in the laboratory
a prototypical retail market in which buyers and sellers must coordinate on using a
payment method. We build on a literature that has successfully adopted experimental
methodologies to empirically analyze the operation of market mechanisms (Smith
1962), financial markets (in)efficiency (Noussair and Tucker 2013), and coordination
problems (Devetag and Ortmann 2007, Arifovic and Jiang 2014, Arifovic, Jiang,
and Xu 2014).
The primary goal of this study is to identify features of experimental markets that
facilitate coordination on electronic payments as opposed to cash payments. We focus
on the influence of service fees and rewards associated with electronic payments
because these monetary components are at the forefront of the current debate (Board
of Governors 2011). In the experiment, we manipulate the cost that sellers sustain
from executing an electronic transaction. This cost represents the “merchant service
fee” customarily paid by sellers to the service provider—the seller’s financial
institution.3 We also manipulate the monetary benefit for buyers who use electronic
payments, treating subjects with a monetary reward from electronic purchases,
which commonly takes the form of dollars, miles, or other types of bonuses.
1. See, for instance, World Bank (2011). For the U.S., Klee (2008) reports that cash captures 54% of
all transactions collected from scanner data at 99 grocery stores. Survey data from Austria and Canada
show that more than 50% of all consumption purchases are paid for with cash (Huynh, Schmidt-Dengler,
and Stix 2013).
2. For example, Humphrey (2010) ranks the overall unit cost of various payment methods based on
U.S. data and report that debit cards have the lowest cost while cash has the highest ($0.90 versus $1.49).
There can be also nonmonetary considerations such as safety, convenience for record-keeping, privacy, tax
evasion and counterfeiting, etc.; for a theoretical discussion of some of these issues, see Camera (2001)
and Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2005).
3. Sellers pay a service fee (or discount fee) to the service provider of the electronic payment, which
generally takes the form of a percentage of amount transacted. The “interchange transaction fee,” which
is paid to the debit card issuer, makes up for the largest share of the service fee (U.S. Government
Accountability Office 2009). The Federal Reserve System has recently limited interchange fees for debit
cards transactions to 21 cents plus 5 basis points times the transaction value, but only if the issuer of the
debit card has more than $10 billion in assets; the average service fee is $0.43 for exempt institutions and
dropped to $0.23 for nonexempt (Board of Governors 2011). Credit card transactions are still exempted.
Other components of the service fee are the cost of transaction processing, terminal rental and customer
service, and the service provider’s margin. There are other fees, such as the authorization fee, paid per
authorization, communication fees, etc., but the service fee is the main one directly faced by the merchant.
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We construct a laboratory retail market for a homogeneous good. Before trading,
buyers and sellers independently select cash or electronic payment methods, then
meet in pairs to trade. In the pair, the seller acts as a monopolist, posting a price, and
then the buyer chooses a quantity. The payment methods adopted affect the ability to
trade and, as a result of decentralized decision making, payment methods’ selections
might be incompatible in some trading pairs. A transaction may fail to occur because
the seller does not accept the buyer’s payment method. The experimental design
captures features that are central to the debate about the adoption of electronic versus
cash payments. Specifically, the design assumes that cash is legal tender and that
sellers cannot price discriminate based on the buyer’s payment method. We also
consider a design variation in which only sellers make an adoption choice, while
buyers are assumed to have adopted both payment methods, and can costlessly
switch between them in the middle of a transaction.
Analysis of the data suggests the existence of strong behavioral components
in the patterns of payment method adoption. First, sellers’ service fees on elec-
tronic transactions influence payment methods’ adoption through an unexpected
channel: the presence of fees altered buyers’ selection of payment methods
significantly more than sellers’. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments and
passed on to buyers the anticipated service fees, as theory predicts. Yet, a significant
proportion of buyers selected cash payments. This miscoordination on payment
methods was the source of trade frictions and, consequently, inefficiencies. This
result is robust: when we endowed buyers with both payment methods, they still
remained reluctant to pay electronically. A possible interpretation is that buyers
hoped to induce sellers to post lower prices by revealing their readiness to pay cash.
Second, the experimental data reveal that buyers’ rewards from electronic purchases
had a significant impact on their choice to pay electronically, and was effective at
enhancing the diffusion of electronic payments in the market. The data also allow us
to assess the efficiency loss generated by mismatch in adoption of payment systems,
which we find to increase with the frequency of cash payments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature on
retail payments. Section 2 presents the experimental design, and Section 3 illustrates
the theoretical predictions. Section 4 reports the empirical results on payment
methods’ adoption and aggregate efficiency. Section 5 reports results for the case
when only sellers have to make an adoption choice, which serve as a robustness
check. Section 6 concludes.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a vast literature on payment systems. Here, we focus on empirical studies
that document how consumers’ characteristics and payment methods attributes affect
the diffusion and use of electronic payments relative to cash.
There is evidence that cash is still predominantly used in low-value transactions.
The literature reports a significant correlation between consumers sociodemographic
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characteristics and the payment method adopted; for example, see Arango, Hogg,
and Lee (2015) for recent Canadian survey data. Field evidence also suggests that
acceptability at the point of sale and monetary incentives are relevant variables. For
instance, the study of Austrian and Canadian consumers in Huynh, Schmidt-Dengler,
and Stix (2013) has documented that acceptability is central to payment method
frequency of use. Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2015), Ching and Hayashi (2010),
and Simon, Smith, and West (2010) report that monetary incentives such as buyer
rewards and loyalty programs are significantly associated with payment choices.
Another important consideration that emerges from field studies is the importance
of the relative cost of use of payment methods for their adoption. Borzekowski,
Elizabeth, and Shaista (2008) document this aspect for consumers, by looking at
survey data. In addition, Humphrey, Kim, and Vale (2001) document the existence of
a significant sensitivity to relative costs by looking at aggregate-level field data from
Norway. There is also evidence that price discrimination plays a role: Bolt, Jonker,
and Renselaar (2010) consider survey data from the Netherlands where retailers
can price discriminate depending on the payment method used and found that
surcharges favor cash over card payments. Finally, some researchers have suggested
that a possible reason for the underutilization of electronic payments systems is
the presence of network externalities: Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) study the
automated clearinghouse electronic payments system of the Federal Reserve System
and report the existence of network externalities.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This section presents the setup of the model and the experimental procedures, while
the theoretical predictions are contained in Section 3.4 The experiment has three
main treatments—called Baseline, No-Fee, and Reward—each of which reproduces
in the laboratory a prototypical retail market with an even number of homogeneous
buyers and sellers, in which frequency of use and acceptability of different payment
methods are endogenous. There is an additional treatment, called Switch, which
serves as a robustness check and will be discussed in Section 5; in that treatment
buyers no longer had to make an adoption choice because they were assumed to
have both payment methods at their disposal, and could switch between methods in
the middle of a transaction. Table 1 presents an overview of the treatments.
2.1 Overview of a Session
In each session, 16 subjects are randomly divided into two groups: eight buyers
and eight sellers. Subjects interact anonymously and play 40 trading periods always
4. A variety of models has been proposed to study payment methods. For instance, Camera (2001)
studies competition between cash and electronic payments in a random matching model, Freeman (1996)
studies payment systems in an overlapping generations model, and Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2005)
study the problem of transactions’ privacy in a model with spatial separation. The design we adopt is simple
enough to be suitable for a laboratory investigation.
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TABLE 1
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENT
Treatment
Baseline No-Fee Reward Switch
Parameters
Service fee for electronic, 1 − ε 0.1 0 0.1 0.1
Rebate rate for electronic, r 0 0 0.05 0
Predictions and results
Prices
Theory p∗M , max p∗E 120, 133 120, 120 120, 133 120, 133
Data pM , pE 180, 193 203, 190 192, 203 203, 221Quantities
Theory q∗M , min q∗E , min qˆ∗E 2, 1.62, 1.62 2, 2, 2 2, 1.62, 1.79 2, 1.62, 1.62
Data qM , qM E , qE 1.24, 0.97, 0.85 1.27, 0.93, 1.06 1.19, 0.95, 0.92 0.99, 0.82, 0.94
Adoption of cash payments
Sellers (% of choices) 14.4 2.5 6.2 29.1
Buyers (% of choices) 55.3 13.0 28.2 —
Cash use (% of all settlements) 54.9 11.9 27.6 52.0
Sessions (dd/mm/yy)
26/01/12 24/01/12 31/01/12 22/01/15
26/01/12 24/01/12 02/02/12 23/01/15
12/03/13 11/03/13 13/03/12 23/01/15
12/03/13 11/03/13 13/03/12 24/01/15
N. participants 64 64 64 64
NOTES: Prices: p∗M = equilibrium price posted by sellers who only accept cash (M stands for manual, the word used in the experiment); p∗E =
upper bound of equilibrium price posted by sellers who accept both payment methods (E stands for electronic); pM = average price posted
by sellers who only accepted cash in the experiment; pE = average price posted by sellers who accepted both payments in the experiment.Quantities: q∗M = equilibrium demand for buyer who pays cash when price is p∗M ; min q∗E = equilibrium demand for buyer who pays cash
when price is p∗E ; min qˆ
∗
E = equilibrium demand for buyer who pays electronically when price is p∗E ; qM = average quantity purchased from
sellers who only accepted cash; qM E = average quantity purchased with cash from sellers who accepted electronic payments; qE = average
quantity purchased by buyers who paid electronically. Quantities refer to completed trades; prices are rounded to the nearest integer. In the
Switch treatment, buyers had access to both payment methods; hence, no adoption choice is reported for them and quantities are calculated
using buyers’ preferred method of payment. Sessions were conducted at Purdue University in 2012, and at Chapman University in 2013
and 2015.
in the same role but with changing trading partners. In each period, sellers are
monopolists who can produce a nonstorable good for buyers who are endowed with
m transaction balances, called tokens. Sellers and buyers can remain idle or trade
goods for tokens. Tokens have a fixed redemption value, while the value of a good
to a buyer (or, seller) depends on the quantity consumed (or, produced).
A trading period includes six stages:
(i) Payment method choice: everyone independently selects a means to settle the
current trade, cash or electronic, that is, how to transfer tokens from buyer to
seller;
(ii) Pricing: each seller chooses a unit price p ∈ [0, 400] for the good;
(iii) Matching: buyer–seller pairs are randomly formed, according to a strangers
matching protocol;
(iv) Demand: each buyer observes the posted price p and demands q ∈ [0, 4]
goods;
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(v) Payment: buyers complete the trade by transferring no less than pq tokens to
the seller;
(vi) Outcome: payoffs are realized.
The Baseline treatment captures two key empirical characteristics of retail
payments. Sellers cannot refuse cash (called “manual payment” in the experimental
instructions, see Supporting Information). Electronic payments are more convenient
and reliable than cash payments, but are also more costly for sellers.
In the experiment, all sellers must accept cash and their choice is whether to also
accept electronic payments. Buyers must select either cash or electronic payment
for the period—a design feature that decreases complexity, as buyers do not have to
make an additional portfolio choice. The choice of payment method is costless and
remains private information until the outcome stage.
When everyone has selected a payment method, each seller chooses a price
p. Then, in each round, buyer–seller matches are randomly formed with uniform
probability among all possible matches. At this point, each buyer sees the seller’s
price and is given the opportunity to demand a quantity q. Choosing q = 0 amounts
to choosing not to trade. Finally, buyers must pay, after which earnings are realized
at the end of the period. The interaction is local: subjects observe only the outcome
in their pair and have no information about the economy as a whole. Furthermore,
the interaction is anonymous: subjects cannot see the identity of the other person in
their pair (experimental ID), hence there is no scope for reputation formation.
2.2 Payoffs
Subjects’ instructions (see Supporting Information) described the payoff functions
in tokens, by means of tables and charts reporting tokens’ earnings for given amounts
q ≥ 0 traded.
If there is no trade (q = 0), then the buyer’s payoff corresponds to his transaction
balance endowment for the period, m, which is a random integer uniformly
distributed between 250 and 350 tokens. The seller’s payoff corresponds to a fixed
endowment A = 350, a parameter introduced to minimize differences in cash
payments for subjects with different roles.
If there is trade (and the buyer earns no rebates), then the buyer’s payoff is
m + u(q) − pq,
where u(q) = 2θ√q is the consumption utility, pq is the expenditure, and θ = 169.5.
The seller’s payoff is
A + q(εp − g) − F.
Net earnings include the gross revenue pq minus production costs and possible
service fees. Production costs have a fixed component F = 15 and a variable
component gq, with g = 60. If payments are electronic, then the seller pays the
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merchant service fee (1 − ε)pq, where 1 − ε is called the service fee. The service
fee is a treatment variable in the experiment (Table 1); it takes values 0.1 in
Baseline and Reward, and 0 in No-Fee where the seller’s payoff is thus simply
A + q(p − g) − F .5
2.3 Settling a Trade
A trade of quantity q and price p can take place only if the seller accepts the
buyer’s method of payment, and if the buyer has transaction balances m ≥ pq.
A buyer starts the period with m transaction balances in a cash or an electronic
account (depending on the payment method chosen). Cash payments have an explicit
manual component. A buyer’s cash account displays the transaction balances as a
set of tokens of different sizes (1, 5, 10, or 50-unit tokens) ordered from large to
small. Large-size tokens can be broken down into smaller ones by clicking a button.
To pay the amount pq, the buyer must manually select a suitable combination
of tokens with a series of mouse clicks, and then must execute the payment by
clicking a button (see Instructions). Electronic payments, instead, are executed
with a mouse click, which immediately transfers pq tokens to the seller. Hence,
electronic payments eliminate execution errors and minimize the effort and time to
completion.
To induce differences in reliability and convenience of the two payment methods,
subjects face a trading-time constraint. The entire trade sequence, from Pricing to
Payment (stages (ii)–(v)), must be completed within 60 seconds.6 A trading clock
starts after everyone has selected their payment method and trade fails if payments
are not completed in time.
2.4 Outcomes
A transaction (or trade) succeeds if the seller accepts the buyer’s payment method,
the trade is executed on time, and with a sufficient transfer of tokens. Otherwise
the trade fails. At the end of each period, in the Outcome stage, buyer and seller
are informed whether trade succeeded or failed. In the first case, they see the
quantity traded, the earnings, and the payment method selected by their counterpart.
Otherwise, they are informed about the reason for the failure. At each point in time,
subjects can see their own trading history in the session. These rules and parameters
are common knowledge.
5. In field economies, sellers who accept credit or debit cards pay a Merchant Discount Rate or
Merchant Service Fee to the acquirer bank. Service fees range from a few basis points up to 3% or more,
and account for costs for electronic payment processing, settling fees, interchange fees paid to the issuer,
etc. In addition to explicit service fees, there may be implicit costs associated with tax-avoidance, which
is more easily accomplished if payments are made in cash. Given these considerations, the 10% fee of
the design—selected to better differentiate equilibrium prices across treatments—is therefore not so much
unrealistic.
6. To familiarize subjects with the experiment, in periods 1–6 the time constraint was 120 seconds and
the payment method was exogenously imposed (electronic in periods 1–3, and cash in periods 4–6).
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2.5 The Treatments No-Fee and Reward
Compared to the Baseline treatment, in the No-Fee treatment the sellers’ service
fee is set to zero, so ε = 1 in the seller’s payoff function. In the Reward treatment,
instead, half of the seller’s service fee is rebated to the buyer. Hence, letting r = 1−ε2
denote the generic rebate rate in the Reward and No-Fee treatments, the buyer’s
payoff can be written as
m + u(q) − pq(1 − r ),
where the treatment variable r = 0.05 in Reward because 1 − ε = 0.1, while r = 0
in No-Fee because 1 − ε = 0 in which case the buyer’s payoff is as in Baseline (see
Table 1).
We recruited 256 undergraduate subjects, half at Purdue University and half at
Chapman University for the three main treatments and all at Chapman University
for the Switch treatment (Table 1). The experiment was programmed and conducted
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Instructions were read aloud at the
start of the experiment and left on the subjects’ desks. No eye contact was possible
among subjects. Average earnings were $22 per subject.7 On average, a session
lasted about 2 hours, including instruction reading, a quiz, and final payments.
3. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
This section studies the symmetric Nash equilibria of the game for the three main
treatments, which we have described in the previous section. To do so, we move
backward, starting with the derivation of the optimal demand schedule in a trade
match, given a price p and rebate rate r . Then, we study the optimal price posted
by sellers given a service fee 1 − . Finally, given optimal pricing and demand
schedules, the optimal payment method adoption strategy is studied.
Let μi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that player i = b, s (b =buyer, s =seller)
selects cash payments. Hence, μs is the probability that a seller only accepts cash,
1 − μs is the probability that a seller also accepts electronic payments, while 1 − μb
and μb are, respectively, the probabilities that a buyer pays electronically and with
cash. The following definitions will be helpful in what follows:
 Acceptability of electronic payments is the probability that a seller accepts an
electronic payment, 1 − μs . Cash payments are always accepted.
 The reliability of a payment method is the probability of a successful trade
conditional on the given payment method being accepted by the seller. In the
experiment, reliability is endogenous. The (absolute) reliability of electronic
7. The show up fee was $5 for all treatments at Purdue (at Chapman, $14 for No-Fee and $7 for the
other treatments) and the conversion rate was 7 cents for every 100 tokens at Purdue (at Chapman, $0.07
for No-Fee and $0.12 for the other treatments). Following local lab standards, Chapman students were
paid more.
GABRIELE CAMERA, MARCO CASARI, AND STEFANIA BORTOLOTTI : 371
payments is denoted Re and the (absolute) reliability of cash payments is denoted
Rm . Let σ := Rm/Re be the relative reliability of cash payments.
 Trade risk for a buyer is the probability of failing to trade with a given payment
method because of acceptability or reliability problems. The trade risk of elec-
tronic payments is μs + (1 − Re)(1 − μs). The trade risk of cash payments is
1 − Rm .
 Trade frictions in the economy are the expected share of failed trades out of
all possible trades, that is, the expected failure rate of electronic transactions
(due to mismatch and reliability problems) and of cash transactions (due to
reliability problems). Normalizing trade frictions by the reliability of electronic
transactions when Re is close to one, trade frictions are approximately8
τ := (1 − μb)μs + (1 − σ )μb.
In the experimental data, Re is close to one, but Rm is not. Hence, theoretical
predictions can be derived considering electronic transactions as being approximately
always reliable, implying that σ approximates the reliability of cash payments, while
1 − σ and μs approximate the trade risk of cash and electronic payments.
3.1 Prices and Quantities
Optimal demand is characterized in the following lemma:
LEMMA 1 (Optimal demand). Given a price p and a rebate parameter r , the optimal
demand of an unconstrained buyer satisfies





× 1(1 − r )2 ,
while a constrained buyer demands m/p.
PROOF. See Appendix. 
If the buyer’s transaction balances are insufficient to satisfy her demand,
m < p × q(p; r ), then the optimal quantity demanded is simply m/p. Otherwise,
if the buyer is unconstrained, she optimally demands q(p; r ) goods. This quantity
decreases with the price p and increases with the rebate rate r .
The model is parameterized so that in equilibrium demand is always interior
(see Supporting Information). The quantity demanded is unaffected by the seller’s
payment method because sellers cannot price-discriminate. It depends on the buyer’s
8. The expected share of failed trades out of all possible trades is
τ ∗ := (1 − μb)μs + (1 − Re)(1 − μb)(1 − μs ) + (1 − Rm)μb,
that is, the expected failure rate of electronic transactions (first two terms, capturing mismatch and
reliability problems) plus that of cash transactions (third term). Normalized trade frictions are τ = τ∗Re . For
Re ≈ 1—as in the experimental data (see later)—we have τ ≈ (1 − μb)μs + μb(1 − σ ), where σ = RmRe .
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payment method if there are rewards from electronic payments. The quantity traded,
instead, depends on the payments methods of both parties.
To derive the optimal pricing schedule, recall that sellers are monopolists with
linear payoffs over tokens. They choose a price p to maximize expected profits. A
trade succeeds only if the seller accepts the buyer’s payment method and, conditional
on that, if the trade can be executed on time.
LEMMA 2 (Optimal posted price). Consider the treatment parameters (ε, r ) and the
endogenous probabilities (μb, σ ). The profit-maximizing prices for a seller who,
respectively, refuses and accepts electronic payments are
pM := 2g and pE := pM × μbσ (1 − r )
2 + (1 − μb)
μbσ (1 − r )2 + (1 − μb)ε .
PROOF. See Appendix. 
A seller who does not anticipate receiving electronic payments posts a price pM ,
which is below the price pE posted if some electronic payments are expected, where
pM ≤ pE ≤ pM
ε
.
Sellers who expect some electronic payments charge premium prices to recoup
the expected service fees. The premium depends on the anticipated incidence of
electronic transactions, and therefore is bounded above (approximately) by the
service fee 1 − ε; it falls in μb and converges to zero as μb → 1.9
To summarize, the design ensures that if sellers pay a service fee to receive
electronic payments (Baseline), then they charge premium prices, where the premium
is roughly equal to the service fee 1 − ε. If buyers earn rewards from electronic
purchases (Reward), then they increase their demand by a percentage roughly equal
to the service fee. If electronic payments have neither costs nor benefits (No-Fee),
then prices and quantities are independent of the payment method adopted.
3.2 Payment Methods’ Adoption
Given optimal prices and quantities, we determine the choice of payment methods
in symmetric Nash equilibrium. In doing so, we differentiate use from adoption of
a payment method. Use refers to the payment method utilized in a successful trade.
Adoption refers to the individual choice of payment method.
9. Due to the fixed cost F , sellers trade only if their expected profit is nonnegative. The design
parameters ensure that equilibrium profits are positive, that is, F is below net earnings q(p; r )(εp − g)
and q(p)(p − g). See Supporting Information.
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Using Lemma 1, let q(p) := q(p; 0) when r = 0, hence let qE := q(pE ) and
qM = q(pM ) denote the (optimal) quantity demanded by a buyer who pays cash and
faces, respectively, prices pE and pM . In contrast, let
qˆE := q(pE )(1 − r )2
denote the quantity demanded by a buyer who pays electronically; clearly, the
buyer cannot trade with sellers posting pM , because they only accept cash. Using
a linear approximation around ε = 1, observe that qˆE/qE ≈ 1 − ε when ε is small.
To summarize, all else equal, buyers demand an identical quantity unless rewards
are given for electronic payments; in that case, buyers who have selected electronic
payments demand more than other buyers.
Let μi denote the probability that any player i selects cash payments in symmetric
Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium payoff Vbj to a buyer who pays using method
j = E, M and has m transaction balances is
VbE = m + (1 − μs)[u(qˆE ) − pE (1 − r )qˆE ],
VbM = m + σ {(1 − μs) [u(qE ) − pE qE )] + μs [u(qM ) − pMqM ]} .
(1)
Sellers who, respectively, accept and refuse electronic payments have payoffs
VsE = A + μbσ [qE (pE − g) − F] + (1 − μb)[qˆE (εpE − g) − F],
V sM = A + μbσ [qM (pM − g) − F].




1 if V jM − V jE > 0
[0, 1] if V jM − V jE = 0
0 if V jM − V jE < 0.
Traders evaluate the expected relative benefits of paying with cash and electronically.
Everyone benefits from the greater reliability of electronic payments. However, buyers
and sellers face different incentives. For buyers, electronic payments generate rewards
but may also carry the risk of being declined. The opposite is true for sellers; accepting
electronic payments resolves coordination problems in payment methods, but using
them may generate costs. This generates coordination problems.
PROPOSITION 1 (Equilibria). Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1–2. Every
treatment supports two symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria characterized by
homogeneous adoption of a single payment method.
PROOF. See Appendix. 
The design ensures that in all treatments two Nash equilibria coexist, which
are characterized by the uniform adoption of one payment method. The two
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pure-strategy equilibria μ j = 0, 1 for j = b, s coexist in each treatment
(Table 1).10 These equilibria always coexist because payment method choices
are strategic complements. If sellers refuse electronic payments, then a buyer’s
dominant action is to pay cash, hence μb = μs = 0. If every seller accepts both
payment methods, then buyers prefer electronic payments when these generate
rewards or are more reliable; otherwise, buyers are indifferent. Hence, μb = μs = 1
is always a symmetric equilibrium. It follows that, in each treatment, subjects face
a coordination problem, which by design cannot be solved through communication.
Note that payment methods’ adoption choices have implications for the level of
trade frictions τ in the economy. Although cash payments are less reliable than elec-
tronic, buyers’ adoption of cash payments is not necessarily a source of trade frictions.
In fact, an increase in buyers’ frequency of adoption of electronic payments reduces
trade frictions τ only when electronic payments have a lower relative trading risk,
μs < 1 − σ . Therefore, this design ensures an endogenous association between rela-
tive diffusion of electronic payments and trade frictions. This, and the pricing associ-
ated with different adoption modes, has implications for efficiency, as we explain next.
3.3 Efficiency
The economy may exhibit inefficiencies because of pricing distortions, which lead
to inefficient quantities, and because of frictions due to failed transactions.
Consider the first inefficiency, which is along the intensive margin. Let q∗ satisfy





. From Lemmas 1–2, the quantities traded in each of
the two pure-strategy equilibria are
q =
{
qM = q∗/4 if μb = μs = 1,





< qM if μb = μs = 0.
Traded quantities are inefficiently low when all transactions involve costly electronic
payments because service fees amount to a distortionary tax. Minimum equilibrium
consumption occurs when buyers earn no rewards, r = 0. It follows that trade
surplus is the lowest when costly electronic payments are adopted, because













− F = u(qM ) − gqM .
(2)
Now consider the extensive margin inefficiency. We measure aggregate efficiency
by ex-ante social welfare W , defined as the sum of payoffs to buyer and seller, net
10. The Appendix reports the complete set of symmetric equilibria. In particular, there exists a sym-
metric equilibrium in which sellers mix, while buyers adopt cash payments. This equilibrium is not robust
to trembles as it introduces mismatch risk; hence, sellers have an incentive to accept both payments since
there is no cost from doing so.
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TABLE 2
EFFICIENCY AS A FUNCTION OF ADOPTION CHOICES
Sellers
Cash Cash+Electronic
Buyers Cash σ [u(qM ) − gqM − F] σ [u(qE ) − gqE − F]
Electronic 0 u(qˆE ) − gqˆE − F
NOTES: Each cell reports the ex-ante social welfareW from expression (3) for all combinations (μb , μs ).





μiV iM + (1 − μi )V iE
]+ (1 − μb)(1 − μs)pE q(pE ; r )(1 − ε − r )
−(A + m).
Here, service fees are not a deadweight loss because they either compensate buyers
(rewards) or some unmodeled service providers. In the expressionW service fees are
net of rewards, pE q(pE ; r )(1 − ε − r ), and are multiplied by (1 − μb)(1 − μs), which
is the expected frequency of electronic purchases. Substituting forV iE ,V iM we obtain
W = (1 − μb)(1 − μs)[u(qˆE ) − gqˆE − F] + μb(1 − μs)σ [u(qE ) − gqE − F]
+ μbμsσ [u(qM ) − gqM − F].
(3)
The expression above indicates that a planner would impose the uniform adoption of
the highest return payment method to avoid mismatch in payment preferences, and
note that
W =
{WM := σ [u(qM ) − gqM − F] if μb = μs = 1,
WE := u(qˆE ) − gqˆE − F if μb = μs = 0.
Table 2 reports efficiency as a function of adoption choices. What payment system
would the planner adopt, then?
PROPOSITION 2 (Efficiency). Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1–2. If the
relative reliability of cash payments is
σ ≤ σ ∗ := u(qˆE ) − gqˆE − F
u(qM ) − gqM − F ,
then social welfareW is maximized by common adoption of electronic payments.
To prove it, note that cash trades are associated with the greatest trading
efficiency, qˆE ≤ qM , but are unreliable—trade succeeds only with probability σ .
The planner selects electronic payments if WM ≤WE , that is, when cash payments
are sufficiently unreliable. This occurs if σ ≤ σ ∗ where σ ∗ < 1 whenever ε < 1;
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see (2). Given the design parameters we have σ ∗ = 0.93 in Baseline and σ ∗ = 0.96
in Reward. It is immediate that σ ∗ = 1 in No-Fee since quantities are independent
of the payment method used; coordinating on the use of electronic payments is
always optimal in this treatment since there are no price distortions. For the other
treatments, it depends on the realized value of σ .
4. RESULTS: MAIN TREATMENTS
This section focuses on two questions: did our experimental markets succeed in
coordinating on using a common payment method? And how did service fees and
rewards associated with electronic payments alter trade patterns and efficiency? We
report four main results. Results 1–3 concern the diffusion of the payment methods.
Result 4 reports the relationship between payment methods and trade frictions and
efficiency.
All analyses focus on the three main treatments and exclude the initial six periods,
where, in order to familiarize participants with the task, only one payment method
was made available. Hence, adoption refers to the individual choice of payment
method, and use refers to the payment method employed in a successful transaction.
Section 5 will subsequently discuss the robustness of the results to the alternative
design adopted in the Switch treatment—where buyers were assumed to be able to
pay with either method.
RESULT 1 (Use of payment methods). There was mixed use of payment methods in
the Baseline treatment. The use of electronic payments prevailed in the No-Fee and
Reward treatments.
Tables 1 and 3 provide support for Result 1. Among all trades that are successfully
completed, 45.1% were settled with an electronic payment in Baseline, 72.4% in
Reward and 88.1% in No-Fee (Table 1). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test reveals that
both the difference between Baseline and No-Fee and between Baseline and Reward
are significant (p = 0.021 and p = 0.083, respectively, two-sided, N1 = N2 = 4).
Further support is provided by a probit regression, where the dependent variable is
the use of payment methods and takes value 1 for electronic trades and 0 for cash
trades (Table 3, Model 1). The econometric analysis shows that introducing rewards
for buyers or eliminating sellers’ service fees significantly raised overall use of
electronic payments.
Recall that in all treatments the equilibrium where everybody trades with cash
coexists with the one where all trades are electronic. A possible interpretation of
Result 1 is that the cost associated with electronic payments serves as a coordination
device for payment methods’ selection.
To shed further light on Result 1, we separately study the adoption choices of
sellers and buyers.
RESULT 2 (Adoption choices). In all treatments, sellers were more likely to adopt
electronic payments than buyers.
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TABLE 3
USE AND ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS
Dependent variable: Use Adoption
Payment method Pooled Buyers Sellers
(1 = electronic, 0 = cash) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No-Fee treatment 2.831*** 1.677*** 2.391*** 0.918***
(0.473) (0.261) (0.406) (0.301)
Reward treatment 1.507*** 0.721*** 1.390*** 0.134
(0.469) (0.246) (0.395) (0.276)
Buyer role −1.346***
(0.208)
Period 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Purdue location −0.599 −0.553*** −0.438 −0.622***
(0.375) (0.207) (0.323) (0.236)
Constant −0.650* 1.024*** −0.683** 1.159***
(0.393) (0.240) (0.332) (0.257)
N. obs. 2,986 6,528 3,264 3,264
Log likelihood −904.833 −1,698.241 −1,112.420 −573.073
NOTES: Probit regression with individual random effects. The dependent variable takes value 1 if electronic payments are chosen and 0
otherwise. Model 1 studies the use of payment methods considering only observations corresponding to buyers who successfully traded.
Models 2–4 study the adoption of payment methods; model 1 pools adoption choices of sellers and buyers, while models 3 and 4 separately
consider adoption choices of buyers and sellers, respectively. The default treatment is Baseline. The explanatory variable Buyer role equals
1 for a buyer and 0 for a seller, while the dummy Purdue assumes value 1 for sessions carried out at Purdue University and 0 for sessions
at Chapman University. Periods 7–40 and main treatments only. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Figure 1 shows adoption rates by type of trader. Pooling all treatments, sellers
chose electronic payments in 92% of cases, while buyers adopted electronic
payments in 68% of instances; such difference is significant according to a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p < 0.001, two-sided, NB = NS = 12). Buyers were
significantly more reluctant to adopt electronic payments than sellers in each
treatment (p = 0.043, 0.020, 0.021 in Baseline, No-Fee, and Reward, respectively;
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum, NB = NS = 4). This significance is confirmed by a
probit regression where the dependent variable is the payment method adopted by a
trader (Table 3, Model 2); the disparities in adoption rates between buyers and sellers
(Buyer role dummy) remain significant even after controlling for treatment effects.
It is surprising that buyers were reluctant to adopt electronic payments, and sellers
were not, because buyers never suffered a direct cost, while sellers did. Hence, one
would imagine that buyers would readily adopt the most convenient method, while
sellers might not. Instead, the opposite holds true. Introducing buyers’ rewards
from electronic purchases or eliminating sellers’ service fees boosts the diffusion
of electronic payments primarily because it alters buyers’ behavior. On average,
45% of buyers chose electronic payments in Baseline, a rate that increased to 72%
if rewards were added and to 87% if fees were removed. The increases relative to
Baseline are significant as shown by a probit regression (Model 3 in Table 3) and
by nonparametric tests (p = 0.021 and p = 0.083 for No-Fee versus Baseline and
Reward versus Baseline, respectively; two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum, N1 = N2 = 4).
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FIG. 1. Adoption of Electronic Payments.
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TABLE 4
BUYERS’ ADOPTION OF PAYMENT METHODS
Treatment
Share of buyers Baseline No-Fee Reward
Regular users
Cash payment 0.22 0.00 0.00
Electronic payment 0.06 0.44 0.22
Occasional users
One or two switches 0.13 0.25 0.16
Three or more switches 0.59 0.31 0.63
In contrast, sellers’ adoption choices are less sensitive to changes across treatments.
Average adoption rates of electronic payments for sellers were 86% , 94%, and 98%
in Baseline, Reward, and No-Fee. The only significant difference is between No-Fee
and Baseline according to a probit regression (Model 4 in Table 3); the magnitude
of the effect is also smaller for sellers than buyers.11 This is interesting because
it implies that subjects’ dollar costs and revenues from using electronic payments
cannot entirely explain adoption choices in the experiment.12
A referee noted that some of our findings may hinge on the existence of feedback ef-
fects between the two sides of the market—some form of network externality. Buyers
will more readily adopt electronic payments when many sellers adopt electronic pay-
ments, for instance. To test this hypothesis, we estimated sellers and buyers’ decisions
jointly using a bivariate probit model (see Supporting Information). In one model, we
also included lagged regressors that capture the counterparts’ past behavior because
in the experiment individuals on each side of the market slowly learn about behavior
of the other side through personal experience. We find support for the notion that past
experience influences present behavior, but the correlations of residuals—although
positive—are insignificant, suggesting that network externalities do not play a role.
RESULT 3 (Buyers’ adoption choices). Regular users of cash payments emerged only
in Baseline. Removing service fees and adding rewards greatly increased the number
of regular users of electronic payments.
Table 4 provides support for Result 3. Buyers who always adopted cash payments,
which we call “regular users,” were 22% in Baseline and none in the other treatments.
There also exists a group of buyers who regularly adopted electronic payments;
this group grew from 6% to 44% when the service fee was removed. Most buyers
11. According to nonparametric analysis, the only significant difference is between No-Fee and Reward
(p = 0.042, two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum, NN F = NR = 4).
12. All else equal, a decrease in ε from 1 to 0.9 generates lower dollar earnings for subjects who
sell electronically, because now they are charged a service fee. The data reveal that altering the subjects’
monetary incentives by eliminating this service fee in the No-Fee treatment does not significantly increase
the seller’s frequency of electronic payments’ adoption relative to the Baseline treatment. Hence, this
variation in dollar earnings is not sufficient to significantly alter the subjects’ behavior.
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TABLE 5
BUYERS’ ADOPTION OF CASH PAYMENTS
Dependent variable:
Share of buyers who
adopted cash Model 1 Model 2










N. obs. 408 408
Log Likelihood 151.347 158.555
NOTES: Tobit regressions with session random effects, censored at 0. The dependent variable is the share of buyers who chose cash payments in
each period of each treatment. The unit of observation is the period average within a session. Trade frictions are per-period session averages.
Symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
were occasional users who switched payment systems. The switching probability
significantly declined with experience and increased whenever a buyer experienced
a trade failure. It made no difference whether the failed trade involved an attempt to
pay electronically or with cash.13 Such disparities in adoption choices contributed to
generate endogenous trade frictions and inefficiencies, as discussed below.
RESULT 4 (Trade frictions and efficiency). There is a positive association between
buyers’ adoption of cash payments, trade frictions, and efficiency losses.
Tables 5 and 6 provide support for Result 4. Trade frictions are measured
as the frequency of failed transaction in the economy (see Section 4). Frictions
endogenously emerged in every treatment and were positively associated with
the diffusion of cash payments in the experimental retail markets. The highest
incidence of trade frictions is found in Baseline, followed by Reward, and No-Fee
(Jonckheere-Terpstra test; p-value = 0.012, N = 12, two-sided). Tobit regressions
show a positive, significant association between trade frictions and buyers’ adoption
of cash payments also after controlling for treatments effects (Table 5).
Buyers were pivotal in determining the diffusion of payment methods in our
experimental retail markets, and trade frictions largely depended on their adoption
choices. The data allow us to separately measure trade frictions that are due to
reliability problems and to acceptability problems (Table 6). Buyers who adopted
cash payments were exposed to trade risk that was entirely due to reliability issues
because by design cash was always accepted. On the other hand, buyers who adopted
13. Evidence comes from a probit regression on individual changes in payment methods (Table 1 in
Supporting Information), where we controlled for buyers’ types according to their prevalent adoption of
payment methods, electronic or cash.
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TABLE 6
ENDOGENOUS TRADE FRICTIONS: ACCEPTABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND TRADE RISK
Treatment
Baseline No-Fee Reward
Trade frictions τ 0.114 0.051 0.091
Buyers’ choice of payment: cash
Fraction of choices μb 0.553 0.130 0.282
Trade risk 0.103 0.154 0.127
Reliability Rm 0.869 0.846 0.873
Acceptability 1 1 1
Buyers’ choice of payment: electronic
Fraction of choices 1 − μb 0.447 0.870 0.718
Trade risk 0.105 0.039 0.083
Reliability Re 0.973 0.985 0.977
Acceptability 0.859 0.976 0.935
Performance of cash relative to electronic payments
Relative reliability σ 0.893 0.859 0.893
Relative acceptability 1.2 1.0 1.1
NOTES: Average incidence of trade failures unconditional and conditional on the buyer’s payment. Trade frictions are the incidence of failed
trades as a percentage of all possible trades. Trade risk for a buyer using payment method i = E, M is the incidence of trade failures either
due to reliability or acceptability by the seller. Reliability is the percentage of successful trades, conditional on the payment method being
accepted. Acceptability is the percentage of times the buyer’s payment method is accepted by the seller. Reliability and acceptability measures
are an average of session averages. All numbers are rounded up to the closest decimal point.
electronic payments, were primarily exposed to trade risk due to acceptability issues
because electronic payments were very reliable.
In the experiment, reliability and acceptability of payment methods were en-
dogenous. Cash payments had about 85% reliability, which means that a buyer who
intended to pay cash faced a 15% probability of being unable to complete the trade.
In contrast, electronic payments were very reliable (97–98%) but their acceptability
varied between 86% and 98%, depending on the treatment.14 As a result, buyers who
adopted electronic payments faced a trade risk that was between 3.9% and 10.5%.
Overall, the two payment methods exhibited similar trade risk in Baseline, while
electronic payments minimized trade risk when service fees were removed or buyers’
rewards added. This suggests that relative trade risk considerations could well be the
driving force behind buyers’ adoption of payment methods.
Trade frictions, together with price and quantity distortions gave rise to substantial
inefficiencies. Table 7 reports theoretical and realized efficiency measures. The
highest theoretical efficiency level is W = 344.13 (equation (3)) but it cannot be
achieved in every treatment. It can be achieved either when everyone adopts cash
payments that are fully reliable (μb = μs = 1 and σ = 1), or when everyone adopts
electronic payments that carry no costs for sellers (μb = μs = 0 and  = 1). We use
this upper bound to normalize all values in Table 6 so that our efficiency measures
are reported as a fraction of the highest theoretical value.
14. The data reveal that cash trades failed primarily due to time constraints and not underpayment,
while the reverse is true for electronic trades, which primarily failed due to underpayment and not time
constraints (see also Table 2 in Supporting Information).
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TABLE 7
MEASURES OF AGGREGATE EFFICIENCY
Treatment
Normalized efficiencyW Baseline No-Fee Reward
Theoretical 0.93 1.00 0.96
Realized 0.59 0.69 0.62
Breakdown of efficiency losses
(i) Suboptimal adoption 19.7% 11.5% 19.8%
(ii) Suboptimal prices 37.2% 68.5% 46.8%
(iii) Suboptimal consumption 43.1% 20.0% 29.7%
Table 7 reports the theoretical efficiency for a treatment as the highest (normal-
ized) value W that is feasible in that treatment.15 According to Proposition 2, the
highest feasible value implies uniform adoption of electronic payments, because
in the experiment they were sufficiently more reliable than cash payments, σ < σ ∗
(Table 6). Differences in theoretical efficiency across treatments were due to price
and quantity distortions from service fees and rewards (Lemmas 1 and 2). Realized
efficiency is the (normalized) valueW observed in the experiment.
The ordering of treatments in terms of their theoretical efficiency corresponds to
their ordering in terms of realized efficiency. In all treatments there are efficiency
losses, which range from 0.41 to 0.34 of the highest possible efficiency. These losses
originate from three sources: (i) suboptimal adoption of payment methods; (ii) price
departures from theoretical predictions; and (iii) quantities traded that differ from
theoretical predictions.
The greatest source of inefficiency is associated with quantities and prices that
departed from equilibrium. Average prices movements across treatments are con-
sistent with the theoretical comparative statics. In particular, the mean price posted
by sellers who did not accept electronic payments was similar across treatments; in
the Baseline treatment this price was significantly below the mean price of sellers
who accepted electronic payments. However, in the remaining treatments, prices
were not significantly affected by the seller’s payment method choice.16 Average
price levels, instead, were higher than theoretical equilibrium predictions (Table 1)
and such pricing distortion was responsible for a significant efficiency loss because
average quantities traded were below the theoretical equilibrium quantities.
All treatments had some inefficiency resulting from miscoordination in payment
method adoption. Yet, the inefficient adoption of payment methods accounted for
twice as much efficiency loss in the Baseline and Reward treatments compared to
the No-Fee treatment, where there was the highest adoption of electronic payments.
15. For instance, in the Baseline treatment the theoretical highest value isW = 320.04, which is based
on p∗e = 133 and q∗e = 1.62. This value is then normalized, dividing it by 344.13.
16. Statistical evidence is reported in the Supporting Information, see Table 3.
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TABLE 8
CHOICE AND USE OF PAYMENTS METHODS IN BASELINE AND SWITCH
Dependent variable: Preference Adoption
Payment method Use (buyers) (sellers)
(1 = electronic, 0 = cash) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Switch treatment 0.347 0.729 −0.911**
(0.466) (0.470) (0.357)
Period 0.004 0.012*** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant −0.464 −0.684** 1.621***
(0.344) (0.343) (0.278)
N. obs. 1,872 2,176 2,176
Log likelihood −782.718 −871.538 −747.520
NOTES: Probit regression with individual random effects. The dependent variable takes value 1 if electronic payments are chosen (or used) and
0 otherwise. Model 1 studies the use of payment methods considering only observations corresponding to buyers who successfully traded.
Model 2 studies the buyers’ preferred payment method, that is, the method selected to initiate a payment. Model 3 studies adoption choices
of sellers. The default treatment is Baseline; only data from periods 7–40 in Baseline and in Switch are included. Symbols ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
5. WHAT IF BUYERS CAN CARRY CASH AND PAYMENT CARDS?
In this section, we study the case where buyers are no longer constrained to carry
only one method of payment.17 In an additional treatment, called Switch, we modify
the Baseline design to facilitate coordination on use and adoption of electronic
payment methods. Specifically, we assume that buyers have adopted both payment
methods and always carry in their wallets a card for electronic payments as well as
cash. Hence, while sellers must make an adoption choice as in the previous analysis,
buyers can now switch from one method to the other at no cost, in the middle of
a transaction. We study the robustness of our results to this new design, and in
particular with respect to the effect on sellers’ adoption choices and on the use of
payment methods that results in the market.
In the Switch treatment, buyers no longer face acceptability risks because they
always carry a payment method that is accepted by the seller. At the start of each
trading round, buyers must simply select how to initiate a payment in that round. If
they select electronic and this is refused by the seller, then the buyer can promptly
switch to pay with cash. Similarly, buyers who initiate a payment with cash and for
some reason cannot complete it before the trading clock runs out can promptly switch
to using electronic payments. In this manner, the design allows us to differentiate
the buyer’s preferred payment method—the one initially selected—from the method
that is used to settle the transaction.
Analysis of the data from the Switch treatment confirms the robustness of the
results reported in Section 4. Table 8 allows us to compare choice and use of payment
methods in the Switch and Baseline treatments.
17. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry to us.
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The data from successful transactions show that the use of electronic payments
in Switch was similar to Baseline (48% versus 45% of all successful trades);
this difference is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 1.00,
two-sided N1 = N2 = 4; Model 1 in Table 8). To understand this similarity in use
between Baseline and Switch, we study buyers’ preference for a payment method
and sellers’ adoption.
Recall that buyers carried both payment methods at all times and could pay either
way in every transaction. Yet, they remained as reluctant to pay electronically as
in the Baseline treatment. In the Switch treatment, 59% of all transactions were
initiated with an offer to pay electronically, which is not significantly different from
the 45% adoption rate recorded in Baseline (see Model 2 of Table 8).18 In fact, no
buyer regularly initiated a transaction with electronic payments, while a group of
regular cash users emerged (about 12.5%), much as it happened in the Baseline
treatment. The data also reveal that when buyers could not pay using the method
initially selected—which occurred in 20% of all trades—they took advantage of the
opportunity to switch to the other method (77% of all cases). The switch was mostly
to time-consuming cash payments, which probably explains why in a few cases
buyers did not even attempt a switch, but simply gave up on the idea of trading in
that round.
Imposing adoption of both payment methods for buyers changed sellers’ incen-
tives. Sellers adopted electronic payments less frequently in the Switch treatment
compared to Baseline (71% versus 86%), a decline that is statistically significant (see
the Switch treatment dummy variable in Model 3 of Table 8). This is an interesting,
and perhaps surprising, result: one would imagine that giving buyers’ costless access
to both payment methods would foster coordination on adopting electronic payments
in the whole market. Yet, the sellers’ greater reliance on cash observed in the Switch
treatment can be easily explained by cost-mitigation considerations: now that buyers
can switch to pay cash, sellers can safely decrease their trade costs by forestalling any
initial attempt at paying electronically. As a consequence, the fraction of sellers who
adopted electronic payments in the Switch treatment was not significantly different
than the fraction of buyers who initiated a transaction with electronic payments
(71% versus 59%, respectively; p = 0.2482, two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
N1 = N2 = 4).
Finally, we again find a link between efficiency and use of cash, similarly to
what we previously found in the Baseline treatment.19 Overall, these considerations
confirm the robustness of our Baseline results to the case when buyers can costlessly
carry both payment methods.
18. It is interesting to note that 59% is below the buyers’ adoption rate of electronic payments observed
in the No-Fee and Reward treatments, which was 87% and 72%, respectively.
19. Support comes from a tobit regression, censored at 0, using Switch treatment data. We regress
the share of buyers who chose cash payments in a period on “Trade frictions” in a period; the unit of
observation is the period average within a session. The coefficient is positive and highly significative.
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has developed a novel experimental framework to advance research and
to inform policies about payment methods adoption. There are many reasons why
the experimental methodology is useful to advance the study of retail payments. In
the lab, one can construct model economies where agents have perfect information
about the institutions under study. One can also manipulate exogenously the
variables of interest, hence uncovering the relationship between payment systems’
attributes—such as service fees or reward programs—and their diffusion in the
economy. Experiments grant the ability to combine data on use and cost of payment
systems, and to test theoretical predictions, also.
The laboratory platform we have developed is simple, is flexible, and it captures
basic features of two basic retail payment methods, cash and electronic. We have used
it to investigate the payment method’s adoption decisions of individual consumers
and retailers who are motivated by actual incentives. Our aim is to shed light on
the association between features of the economy and individual payment method’s
adoption choices on the one hand, and endogenous trading frictions and social
efficiency on the other hand. In this manner, we complement existing survey-based
studies about consumers and retailers’ adoption decisions.
We have constructed economies in which there always exist an equilibrium where
trade is only executed using cash, and another where all payments are electronic.
Coordinating on using electronic payments maximizes social welfare. The design
captures empirically relevant features of retail markets and, in particular, that buyers
and sellers face different incentives. For buyers, electronic payments generate
benefits but may carry the risk of being declined. The opposite is true for sellers;
accepting electronic payments reduces the risk of trade failures but using electronic
payments generates costs.
The experiment includes three main treatments—Baseline, No-Fee, and Reward—
each of which reproduces in the laboratory a prototypical retail market in which use
and acceptability of payment methods are endogenous. In the Baseline treatment,
sellers suffer a cost from executing an electronic transaction, which is proportional
to the revenue. Service fees are removed in No-Fee, whereas buyers’ rewards are
introduced in Reward. As a robustness check, we also study use and sellers’ adoption
choices when buyers are assumed to have adopted both payment methods, in the
Switch treatment. There are two main lessons.
First, analysis of the data suggests that buyers are pivotal in the diffusion of
electronic payments. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments in all of the main
treatments and did so significantly more than buyers. This is particularly interesting
given that in our setup only sellers suffered electronic payments’ usage costs and
could not price discriminate based on the buyer’s choice of payment method. When
sellers had to pay a service fee, a sizeable group of buyers regularly adopted cash
payments. Buyers remained reluctant to pay electronically even when we imposed
adoption of both payment methods to buyers. This behavior was no longer observed
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when service fees were removed or rewards added; under these conditions, a new
group of buyers emerged, which regularly adopted electronic payments. The relative
use of payments methods did not significantly change when we imposed adoption of
both payment methods to buyers.
Second, the data suggest that regulatory policies aimed at fostering competition
among providers or at increasing reward programs could boost the diffusion of
electronic payments among consumers in retail markets. The experimental data
collected allow us to measure the endogenous extent of trade frictions, to pin down
their source, and to assess their impact in terms of efficiency loss for the entire market.
We find that trade frictions, together with price and quantity distortions, gave rise
to substantial inefficiencies. Interestingly, inefficient diffusion of payment methods
accounted for twice as much efficiency loss in Baseline and Reward, compared to
the No-Fee treatment, where there was the highest adoption of electronic payments.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Consider an economy with a population composed of equal
numbers of anonymous, homogeneous sellers and buyers. We use M to denote cash
as opposed to electronic payments, denoted E .
At the beginning of the period the buyer receives a random amount of tokens
m ∈ [mL , m H ], with uniform probability density function. These transaction
balances can either be spent to purchase goods or simply consumed. Buyers
have quasi-linear preferences defined over transaction balances and goods. If we
normalize the price of tokens to one (the numeraire), then the utility (in tokens) of a
buyer who has m transaction balances and purchases q > 0 goods at price p > 0 is
m + u(q) − pq(1 − r ).
Here, u(q) is the utility from consuming q gods, with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and u(0) = 0.
The expenditure is pq and r denotes a possible reward rate to the buyer, which can
be positive or zero. The reward is earned after the purchase has been executed—it
takes the form of a rebate—and so it is simply “consumed”; the reward cannot be
used to relax the expenditure constraint, that is, we have pq ≤ m.
The buyer chooses q ≥ 0 to solve the problem
max[m + u(q) − pq(1 − r ) + λ(m − pq)],
where λ is the Ku¨hn–Tucker multiplier on the expenditure constraint. The first-order
condition is
u′(q) − p(1 − r ) − λp ≤ 0.
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We can thus define the buyer’s inverse demand function by⎧⎨
⎩
0 if u′(0) ≤ p(1 − r ),




Demand depends on the price p posted by the seller, the transaction balances m, and
the rebate rate r , which may be zero or positive, depending on the treatment. The
demand does not directly depend on the payment method because the seller cannot
price discriminate based on the payment method, and neither method generates a cost
to the buyer. If demand is positive, then u(q) − pq(1 − r ) > 0.
We parameterize the model such that the decomposition q(p(1 − r )) = k(r )q(p) ≥
q(p) holds, where k(0) = 1, k ′(r ) > 0, and q ′(p) < 0 < q ′′(p). When r = 0, we have






q(p(1 − r )) = k(r )q(p) = q(p)(1 − r )2 ,
∂q(p(1 − r ))
∂p
= q ′(p)k(r ) = −2q(p)
p
k(r ) < 0.[−3pt]
That is, for a buyer who encounters a seller posting a price p, q(p) is quantity
purchased if the buyer pays cash, and q(p(1 − r )) is quantity purchased if the buyer
pays electronically and there is a proportional rebate r on electronic purchases.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Each seller is a monopolist who has linear preferences over
tokens and chooses the price p to maximize expected profits, given expected
demand. If q = q(p(1 − r )) for all m ∈ [mL , m H ], then expected demand is simply
q(p(1 − r )). We will work under this conjecture because, under the parametrization
selected, this is true in equilibrium (see Supporting Information).
A seller who accepts electronic payments must accept also cash, and cannot
price discriminate. Given that the buyer demands q goods when the price is p and
the rebate rate is r , the transaction can be completed only if the seller accepts the
buyer’s chosen payment method, and if the buyer transfers at least pq tokens to the
seller. Assume that cash transactions are settled with probability σ . If a transaction
cannot be settled, then nothing is produced. The expected profit VsE (p) of a seller
who accepts electronic payments and posts price p is
VsE (p) := A + μbσ [q(p)(p − g) − F] + (1 − μb)[k(r )q(p)(εp − g) − F],
where μb denotes the (endogenous) probability that the buyer encountered uses cash
payments and we have used the fact that q(p(1 − r )) = k(r )q(p).
The seller always receives the fixed payment A, and may have earnings from
trading with the buyer. With probability 1 − μb, the seller meets a buyer who
uses electronic payments; here, demand is k(r )q(p), so the seller’s profits are
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k(r )q(p)(εp − g) − F. With probability μb, the seller meets a buyer who uses cash,
in which case demand is q(p), and expected profits are σq(p)(p − g) − F.
The first order conditions for an interior solution is
μbσ [q ′(p)(p − g) + q(p)] + (1 − μb)k(r )[q ′(p)(εp − g) + εq(p)] = 0.
Define
η0 := μbσ + (1 − μb)k(r )ε and η1 := μbσ + (1 − μb)k(r ). (A2)
Let pE be the profit-maximizing price for a seller who accepts electronic payments;
pE > 0 uniquely solves
q ′(p) (pη0 − gη1) + q(p)η0 = 0,






where pE > g since η0 < η1 and q ′ < 0.
A seller who does not accept electronic payments trades with probability μbσ ,
that is, when she meets a buyer who has adopted a cash payment method. The
expected profit is
VsM (p) := A + μbσ [q(p)(p − g) − F].
The profit-maximizing price pM uniquely satisfies Q′(p)(p − g) + Q(p) = 0, hence
pM = g − q(pM )q ′(pM ) .
pM is independent of μb, pM ≤ pE , and pE = pM only if μb = 1 or ε = 1 (which
is when η1 = η0). Given the optimal demand function in (A1) we have
pM := 2g and pE := pM η1
η0
. (A3)
We have pM ≤ pE ≤ pMε since η1η0 falls in μb, equalling 1 when μb = 1 and 1ε when
μb = 0. Note that pM is invariant to μb while ∂pE∂μb ∝ σk(r )(1 − ε) < 0.
Due to the fixed cost F , sellers trade only if their expected profit is non-negative
for any choice of payment selected by the buyer. We choose parameters so that
sellers are never inactive, that is, F is below then net earnings q(p)(εp − g) and
q(p)(p − g). To do so, we need to ensure that
F < q(pE )(εpE − g)
in which case F < q(pM )(pM − g). To see this, note that p = pM is the unique
maximizer of q(p)(p − g); it follows that q(pM )(pM − g) > q(pE )(pE − g) for all




μs = 0 x 1 0 x 1 0 x 1
0
√ √ √











NOTES: The table reports all the possible symmetric equilibria. – indicates that the equilibrium exists only if σ = 1 (cash and electronic
payments are equally reliable). -– indicates that the equilibrium is not robust to trembles in buyers’ choice. We let y = (0, 1), that is, any
number in the open unit interval, and x = (1 − σ (1 − r ), 1).
pM < pE . We have q(pE )(pE − g) > q(pE )(εpE − g). So, if q(pE )(εpE − g) −
F > 0, then q(pM )(pM − g) − F > 0; notice also that this implies k(r )q(pE )(εpE −
g) − F > 0 since k(r ) > 0. For the parameters used in the experiment,
F < q(pE )(εpE − g) holds in all symmetric equilibria (see Supporting Information).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Proposition 1 is a special case of Proposition A1 that we
next present and prove.
PROPOSITION A1. Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1–2. Each treatment




(0, 0), (y, 0)
, (1, 0)
, (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r ) = (1, 0);
(0, 0), (y, 0)
, (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r ) = (0.9, 0);
(0, 0), (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r ) = (0.9, 0.05),
for y = (0, 1), and x = (1 − σ (1 − r ), 1). The notation 
 indicates the equilibrium
exists only if σ = 1.
Table A1 summarizes the possible equilibria, by treatment. Consider a symmetric
stationary outcome. Let μi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that a player of type
i = b, s (b = buyer, s = seller) adopts cash payments. Hence, 1 − μs is the
probability that a seller accepts electronic and cash payments, whereas 1 − μb is the
probability that a buyer uses the electronic payment method.
A buyer who adopts electronic payments can only make a purchase if the
seller accepts them. A buyer who adopts cash payments can buy from any seller.
Conjecturing that the buyer is unconstrained in his purchases, let
qˆE = q(pE (1 − r ))
denote the equilibrium quantity demanded when the price is pE and the rebate rate
is r . There is never a reward for a buyer who trades using cash, so we let qE = q(pE )
and qM = q(pM ) denote the equilibrium quantity demanded, when the price is pE
and pM , respectively, and the buyer pays cash.
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The payoff Vbj to a buyer who has adopted payment method j = M, E and has m
transaction balances is thus
VbM = m + σ {(1 − μs) [u(qE ) − pE qE )] + μs [u(qM ) − pMqM ]} ,
VbE = m + (1 − μs)[u(qˆE ) − pE (1 − r )qˆE ].
Here, q j satisfies (A1), p j satisfy (A3) and σ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the probability that a
cash payment is completed in the time allocated to transact. It follows that
VbM − VbE = μsσ [u(qM ) − pMqM ] − (1 − μs)[u(qE ) − pE qE ]
(
1
1 − r − σ
)
.
The second term in the equality above follows from qˆE = k(r )q(pE ) = q(pE )(1−r )2 so we
have u(qˆE ) = u(qE ) 11−r since u(q) =
√q .




1 if VbM − VbE > 0,
[0, 1] if VbM − VbE = 0,
0 if VbM − VbE = 0.
(A4)
The buyer evaluates the difference between expected surplus earned when sellers
accept only cash μsσ [u(qM ) − pMqM ] and the opportunity cost of using cash, which
is simply the expected surplus from using cash with a seller who accepts electronic
payments, (1 − μs)[u(qE ) − pE qE ]; this term is adjusted for the loss of the rebate
rate r and the possibility that the cash transaction is not completed, σ .
Let Vsj denote the payoff to a seller who adopts payment method j = M, E . In an
outcome where buyers are not constrained in their purchases, we have
V sM = A + μbσ [qM (pM − g) − F],
V sE = A + μbσ [qE (pE − g) − F] + (1 − μb)[qˆE (εpE − g) − F],
(A5)
Seller j does not see the buyers’ method of payment before choosing the price p j .
Clearly, qˆE = qE k(r ) = qE(1−r )2 , hence




(1−r )2 (εpE − g) − F
}
.




1 if V sM − VsE > 0,
[0, 1] if VsM − VsE = 0,
0 if VsM − VsE < 0.
(A6)
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Two remarks are in order. First, we choose parameters so that qE (εpE − g) > F .
This not only implies qE(1−r )2 (εpE − g) > F for all r ≥ 1 but also qE (pE − g) > F ;
that is, a seller who accepts electronic payments makes positive profits when he
engages either in an electronic or in a cash transaction (see Supporting Information).
Second, when p j satisfy (A3), we have:
 If μb = 0, then VsM − VsE<0;
 If μb = 1, then VsM − VsE = 0 (because pM = pE = g), and
 If μb ∈ (0, 1), then VsM − VsE<0 for ε<1 sufficiently large.
To prove the last bullet point, recall that qM (pM − g) > qE (pE − g) for all
pM < pE . The price pE monotonically falls to pM as μb grows to 1, whereas
pM is invariant to μb. Hence, qM (pM − g) > qE (pE − g) when ε < 1 or r > 0
and the first term of the expression VsM − VsE is positive for all μb ∈ (0, 1). If
μb = 0, then VsM − VsE < 0; if μb = 1, then VsM − VsE = 0. In principle, we could
have VsM − VsE < 0 for 0 <μb ≤ μ¯b < 1, and V sM − VsE > 0 otherwise. However,
μ¯b < 1 only if ε is sufficiently small; otherwise, there is no μb ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
VsM − VsE = 0. To see this note that for ε = 1 we have pE = pM , in which case
VsM − VsE is negative and increasing in μb. By continuity, this holds also for some
ε < 1 sufficiently close to 1. In the experiments, we set parameters such that this
was always the case. It follows that VsM − VsE < 0 for all μb < 1.
It is now a matter of algebra to verify that the existence of equilibria in Proposition
A1. The procedure is constructive. First, we conjecture that a given value of
μb is an equilibrium. Given this, we find the optimal value for μ′s using (A6).
Imposing symmetry, μ′s = μs , we confirm whether the conjecture is correct for some
parameters by considering (A4). If no parameters support the conjectured value μb
The details can be found in the Supporting Information.
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